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CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)-DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RETURN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE BY MAIL MANDATES PERSONAL
SERVICE, WHICH MUST BE MADE WITHIN 120 DAYS OF
FILING THE COMPLAINT
Green v. Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co. (1987)
On May 12, 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit confronted a question left unresolved by both the language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) l and the more than sev-
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) states:
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of
any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this
rule-
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-
class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with
two copies of a notice and acknowledgment conforming substantially to
form 18-A and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the
sender. If no acknowledgment of service under this subdivision of this
rule is received by the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing,
service of such summons and complaint shall be made under subpara-
graph (A) or (B) of this paragraph in the manner prescribed by subdivi-
sion (d)(1) or (d)(3).
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1983).
The reference to paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)
refers to competent and corporate defendants respectively. See FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(l), (3). For a discussion of the service required where defendant fails to
return acknowledgment of service by mail, see infra notes 80-89 and accompany-
ing text.
In 1981, the preliminary draft report of the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee suggested authorization of service by registered or certified mail, re-
turn receipt requested. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES 4 AND 45 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Sept. 1981), reprinted in 91 F.R.D. 139 (1982).
Many critics voiced early objections to the suggested amendment. See, e.g.,
Comment, Civil Procedure-Service of Summons and Complaint Under State Law Subse-
quent to Attempted Service Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), 14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 565, 568
(1984) (dissension to certified or registered service voiced by law professors and
practitioners); 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4437,
96 F.R.D. 75, 110 (1983) (service by certified or registered mail is not effective
method for ensuring that actual notice is given to defendant); Siegel, Practice
Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Ef. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of
Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 91-92 (1983) (speed with which Supreme
Court acted failed to provide sufficient time for public review and comment).
As a result of the criticism, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was enacted, allowing service
to be effective via first-class mail (not registered or certified as previously recom-
mended). See Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (1982).
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enty court decisions that have interpreted the rule. 2 In Green v.Humphrey
Elevator and Truck Co. ,3 the Third Circuit held that a defendant's refusal
to acknowledge service by mail mandates personal service within 120
days of filing the complaint, pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 4
The issue in Green, whether service by mail pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is proper service under Rule 4(j) when acknowledgment of
the service is not returned, arose in the context of a personal injury ac-
tion. 5 Francis Green filed a complaint in district court against
Humphrey Elevator and Truck Company ("Humphrey") and The Main-
tenance Company ("Maintenance") on October 9, 1985, the last day of
the two-year statute of limitations governing the claim. 6 On February 5,
1986, 119 days after filing the complaint, Green attempted to serve
2. See Green v. Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.
1987); see also Jarvis & Mellman, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: From Hapless to Hopeless, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 2-3. For a discussion of
cases interpreting Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see infra note 96.
3. 816 F.2d 877. Green was a unanimous decision rendered by Circuit
Judges Higgenbotham and Stapleton and District Judge Conaboy, United States
District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Id.
4. Id. at 882. Rule 4(j) states in part:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defend-
ant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on
whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why
such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dis-
missed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own
initiative with notice to such party or upon motion ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j) (1983).
Prior to Green, only a few district courts had examined the interaction be-
tween Rule 4(j) and Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), service by mail. See Watts v. Lyon, No.
84-2593 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (plaintiff
given opportunity to establish why service was not properly made when plaintiff
realized service by mail was defective only after statute of limitations had run);
Shuster v. Conley, 107 F.R.D. 755, 756-58 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (request for exten-
sion of time to effect service denied where mailed service returned marked "ad-
dress attempted not known"); Cool v. Police Dep't of Yonkers, No. 76-1303
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (amended complaint
dismissed when service by mail attempted 4'/2 years after complaint was filed).
For further discussion of the interplay between Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j), see
infra note 90 and accompanying text.
5. Green, 816 F.2d at 877-79. Green alleged that he suffered injuries during
employment in New Jersey on October 9, 1983, as a result of the negligence of
Humphrey Elevator and Truck Company ("Humphrey") and the Maintenance
Company ("Maintenance"). Id. at 877-78.
6. Id. at 878. The alleged injury occurred on October 9, 1983, and the
complaint was filed exactly two years later on October 9, 1985. Id. New Jersey
has a two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. Id. (cit-
ing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952)). Judge Van Artsdalen presiding
over the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did
not reach the issue of whether New Jersey law was likely to control. Id. at n. 1.
However, under Pennsylvania law, the same two-year statute of limitations
would apply. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1982).
5771988]
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Humphrey and Maintenance by mail. 7
On February 13, 1986, the district court issued an order informing
Green that unless good cause was shown why service was not made
within 120 days of filing the complaint, his action would be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 4(j).8 In granting the motions and dismissing the com-
plaint without prejudice, 9 the district court held that, for the purposes of
Rule 4(j), service is effected upon receipt of service, not upon the mail-
ing of service.' 0 The district court further held that Green failed to
show good cause why service was not made within the 120-day period. I
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.12
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Green by redefining the is-
sue.' 3 The court determined the relevant question to be at what time
7. Green, 816 F.2d at 878. To effect service by mail, Green mailed copies of
the summons and complaint to Humphrey and Maintenance. Id. Humphrey re-
ceived mail service on February 10, 1986, 124 days after the complaint was filed.
Id. On February 11, 1986, 125 days after filing, Maintenance received mailed
service. Id. Mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail to a
defendant may effectuate service of process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
8. Green, 816 F.2d at 878. Rule 4(j) provides for dismissal if service is not
complete within 120 days after the complaint's filing. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). For
the text of Rule 4(j), see supra note 4.
District Court Judge Van Artsdalen gave Green 10 days to show good cause
why service was not made within 120 days. 816 F.2d at 878. Green responded
by filing a certification, which asserted only that service had been mailed to both
Humphrey and Maintenance on February 5, 1986, and that return acknowledg-
ments were not returned. Id. Subsequently, Humphrey and Maintenance filed
motions to dismiss Green's complaint for failure to comply with Rule 4(j). ld
9. Green, 816 F.2d at 878. Rule 4(j) permits the dismissal of a complaint
without prejudice, thus the plaintiff is free to file a subsequent complaint. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j); see also Green, 816 F.2d at 878 n.4. A dismissal could be fatal
to Green's recovery, however, because the statute of limitations expired one day
after the initial complaint was filed in district court. See Green, 816 F.2d at 878;
see also Siegel, supra note 1, at 108 (if statute of limitations has expired, dismissal
will be final). But see Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir.
1976) ("Only if the plaintiff cannot amend.., does the order become final and
appealable."); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozier-Chester Medical Center, 721
F.2d 68, 76 (3d Cir. 1983) ("a dismissal without prejudice.., is not a final order
until . . . the time for amendment had expired").
10. Green, 816 F.2d at 878. But see Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d
35, 39 (2d Cir. 1984) (service effected upon receipt by defendant). For the text
of Rule 4(j), see supra note 4.
11. Green, 816 F.2d at 878-79. For a discussion of Green's explanation for
effecting service more than 120 days after the filing of the complaint, see infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
12. Green, 816 F.2d at 879.
13. Id. at 879. The Third Circuit noted that the district court considered
the question of whether service by mail is effected when mailed by the plaintiff
or when received by the defendant. Id. The courts are split on whether return
receipt is necessary to effectuate service or if mere mailing is sufficient. See
Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (service re-
ceived-but-not-acknowledged may be effected without return); but see Delta S.S.
Lines v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant's return and ac-
3
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service is effected for purposes of Rule 4(j) when service by mail is at-
tempted, but when an acknowledgment is not received. 14 The court
concluded that when return acknowledgment is not received, service will
be effected only when personal service is made on the defendant.' 5 Be-
cause personal service was not made within 120 days after the filing of
* the complaint, as is required by Rule 4(j), the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision dismissing the complaint. 16
In construing Rule 4(j), which imposes a 120-day time limit on a
plaintiff for serving a defendant, the court recognized that the meaning
of the rule is not clear on its face. 17 The rule simply states that service
must be "made" within 120 days after the filing of the complaint,' 8 but
fails to explain what constitutes "making service." 19 Therefore, in con-
struing Rule 4(j), the court looked to the legislative history underlying
Rule 4(j), Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Rule 5.2o
The court first examined the congressional intent behind Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). 2 1 According to the legislative history, 22 Congress enacted
knowledgment are essential); Wise v. Commissioner, 624 F. Supp. 1124, 1127
(D. Mont. 1986) (service not valid unless acknowledgment is returned).
14. Green, 816 F.2d 879. Green argued that service was effected within the
120 day deadline of Rule 4(j) because the complaint and summons were mailed
119 days after the complaint's filing. Id. at 878. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). The
defendants, on the other hand, argued that if there is no return acknowledgment
of the mailed service, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) requires that personal service be made
within 120 days of filing the complaint. Green, 816 F.2d at 878. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
15. Green, 816 F.2d at 879. In Green, the defendants received copies of the
complaint and summons, but failed to return acknowledgment of receipt. Id. at
878. No personal service was attempted. Id. For further discussion of the type
of service that must follow a failed attempt at mail service, see infra notes 80-89
and accompanying text.
16. Green, 816 F.2d at 879.
17, Id. The 120-day limit of Rule 4(j) applies to all methods of service of
process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j).
Rule 4(j) provides that an action shall be dismissed "[i]f a service of the
summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the
filing of the complaint ...... FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). For the text of Rule 4(j), see
supra note 4.
18, See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). The Green court recognized the gravity of deter-
mining-when service is "made," since affirming the district court decision to dis-
miss the action would render a subsequent action by Green time-barred. Green,
816 F.2d at 879. For a discussion of the correlation between Rule 4(j) and sub-
sequent filings, see infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
19. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(j). For a discussion of courts' interpretations of
"making" service by mail, see infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
20. Green, 816 F.2d at 880-81. For further discussion of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii),
4(j) and 5, see infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
21. Green, 816 F.2d at 880. Rules 4(j) and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) were adopted by
Congress as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of
1982. Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983). Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was enacted
* in an effort to reduce the burden on the marshals as process servers. See 128
CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4434,4438,96 F.R.D. 75, 116
4
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Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) in order to ensure that defendants receive actual no-
tice, by requiring that an acknowledgment of receipt form be included in
the service by first-class mail. 2 3 Thus, service is effected when the ac-
knowledgment is returned within twenty days of the mailing of service.
However, if the acknowledgment is not returned, service must be ef-
fected through other means.24 The court concluded that Congress' con-
cern for actual notice and the requirement of acts beyond the mailing of
the summons and complaint, indicate that the mere mailing is insuffi-
cient to effect service for the purpose of Rule 4(j). 25
The court next examined Rule 4() to help determine when service
by mail is deemed made when acknowledgment of receipt is not re-
turned. 26 The purpose of Rule 4(j) was "completing service within that
[120-day] time," similar to the purpose of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). 2 7 How-
ever, Rule 4(j) provides that a complaint will not be dismissed even
though service is effected after 120 days, if the plaintiff can show "good
cause" for the delay.2 8 This "good faith exception" was intended to
protect those diligent plaintiffs who have made every effort to comply
with the rule's requirements. 2 9
Additionally, the court noted that Rule 4(j), when read with Rule
4(i), provides that service in a foreign country is specifically exempted
(1983). For further discussion of the legislative history of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see
supra note 1.
22. Although neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate submit-
ted a report with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), Rep. Don Edwards, co-sponsor of the bill
which proposed the amended Rule 4 and a member of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, submitted a historical statement with the bill. Green, 816 F.2d 880 (citing
128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4438, 96 F.R.D.
75, 116 (1983)).
23. Green, 816 F.2d at 880 (citing 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec.
15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4438, 96 F.R.D. 75, 116 (1983)). Congress deleted the
Supreme Court's language which proposed specifying exactly when mail service
is "made" pursuant to Rule 4(j), because of the potential problems with "un-
claimed" mail and default judgments. Id. at 4439 n.8, 96 F.R.D. 75, 118 n.8.
24. See Green, 816 F.2d at 880. See also 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4439-40, 96 F.R.D. 75, 119 (1983).
25. Green, 816 F.2d at 880-81.
26. Id. Because Rule 4(j) does not explicitly state when service is "made,"
the court again turned to legislative intent for guidance. Id. For the text of Rule
4(j), see supra note 4.
27. Green, 816 F.2d at 880 (quoting 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4438, 96 F.R.D. 75, 116 (1983)) (emphasis added by court).
For the court's discussion of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra notes 17-25 and ac-
companying text.
28. Id. at 880. For the text of Rule 4(j) and the good faith exception, see
supra note 4.
29. Id. at 880.
580 [Vol. 33: p. 576
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from the 120-day limit.3 0 The court stated that there would be no logi-
cal reason to exempt foreign process serving if service was effective at
the time of mailing.3 ' Therefore, the court concluded that the policy
behind Rule 4(j) was consistent with that of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)-to pro-
vide actual notice to the defendant.3 2
The court similarly found that Rule 5 supported the interpretation
of 4() that service is not effected upon the mere mailing of service.33
Rule 5, which governs all pleadings and papers subsequent to the com-
plaint, provides that "[s]ervice on a party's attorney by mail is complete
upon mailing."'3 4 The court reasoned that if Congress intended service
under either Rule 4() or Rule 4(c) (2) (C) (ii) to be effective upon mailing,
it could have used language similar to that of Rule 5(a).3 5 Thus, the
court concluded that actual notice is of "paramount importance" in the
overall scheme of Rule 4.36 Therefore, having concluded that actual no-
tice must be received, the court found that the mere mailing of service,
pursuant to Rule 4(c) (2) (C) (ii), was insufficient to ensure such actual no-
tice for the purposes of Rule 40).37
The court next addressed precisely how actual notice may be ef-
fected where receipt has not been verified by return acknowledgment.3 8
The district court had held that service pursuant to Rules 4(j) and
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was made upon receipt by the defendant of the summons
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). Rule 4(0) states in pertinent part: "This subdi-
vision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i)
of this rule." Id. Rule 4(i), inter alia, authorizes service upon a party in a foreign
country. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
31. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. The court stated that "[t]he Rule 4(j) foreign
service exemption only makes sense .. .when the policy concern for actual no-
tice is given primacy." Id.
32. Id. For the court's discussion of the policy behind Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii),
see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
33. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. Rule 5 governs the service and filings of plead-
ings and other papers. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.
34. Green, 816 F.2d at 881 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b)) (emphasis added).
35. Id. The court recognized that congressional silence is not a conclusive
sign of intent, but that the omission of such explicit language from Rule 4(j) is
consistent with Congress' express intent to provide actual notice. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the Green court's interpretation of Congress' express intent, see supra
notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 881.
37. Id.
38. See id. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) requires that two copies of notice and ac-
knowledgment, conforming substantially to Form 18-A, accompany copies of the
complaint and summons for service by mail. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
Form 18-A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
If you do not complete and return the [acknowledgment] form to the
sender within 20 days, you .. .may be required to pay any expenses
incurred in serving a summons and complaint in any other manner per-
mitted by law.
FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18-A.
6
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and complaint. 3 9 The Third Circuit pointed out, however, that such a
holding would burden the courts and parties with evidentiary hearings
whenever a dispute arose as to when and whether service was re-
ceived. 40 Examining what little case law and commentary exist on Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) in conjunction with Rule 4(j), 4 1 the Third Circuit con-
cluded that when a defendant fails to return acknowledgment of service
by mail, personal service must be made upon the defendant within 120
days after filing the complaint. 4 2 This conclusion is consistent with the
39. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. The court found that the district court's deci-
sion, that service is made upon receipt, was not at odds with the policy of actual
notice. Id. However, the Third Circuit stated that service upon receipt was not
the interpretation of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j) that it preferred. Id. For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation, see infra notes 40-42 and accom-
panying text.
40. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. The Second Circuit had previously read the
amended Rule 4 as emphasizing actual notice and, thus, held that service was
effective upon receipt. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 725 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir.
1984). The Morse court recognized that such a holding would at times require
evidentiary hearings to determine when and if service had been made. Id. at 41
n.12. But see Siegel, 28 U.S.C.A. 1985 Practice Commentaries C4-19 (West
Supp. 1988) (Morse hearings involve judicial expenditures of time and effort
when courts ought to be able to make better use of time).
41. Green, 816 F.2d at 882. The Green court first cited Red Elk v. Stotts. Id.
(citing Red Elk v. Stotts, 111 F.R.D. 87 (D. Mont. 1986)). In Red Elk, a civil
rights complaint was brought against a county, a county attorney and county
employees. Red Elk v. Stotts, 111 F.R.D. 87, 88 (D. Mont. 1986). The plaintiff
in Red Elk mailed copies of the summons, complaint and acknowledgment forms,
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), three days before the 120-day limit of Rule 4(j).
Id. The acknowledgment forms were returned after the expiration of the 120-
day limit of 4(j) but within the 20-day limit of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Id. Defend-
ants filed motions to dismiss for insufficiency of service. Id. The Red Elk court
held that service by mail is effected only upon return of the acknowledgment
forms. Id. at 89. The Red Elk court further held that the acknowledgment form
must be received within the 120-day limit of Rule 4(j). Id.
The Green court next cited a Fourth Circuit decision, Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-
Stauffer Bldg. Sys. Green, 816 F.2d at 882 (citing Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer
Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984)). The plaintiff in Armco mailed service
to defendant, who failed to sign and return the acknowledgment form. Armco,
Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir. 1984). No
other method of service was attempted. Id.
The Armco court stated that once service is attempted by mail and an ac-
knowledgment form is not received within the 20-day limit, service must be
made under the subdivision providing for personal service. Id. at 1089. Thus,
the Green court found Armco to support its position by providing that the mere
mailing of service is insufficient for the purpose of Rule 4(j). Green, 816 F.2d at
882.
42. Green, 816 F.2d at 881-83. According to the court, the only significant
commentary on Rule 4(j) adopted the same view. Id. See Siegel, supra note 1, at
113-14. Siegel stated:
It is suggested that if the mail method is to be tried at all, it should be
initiated promptly after the summons has been issued (i.e., the com-
plaint filed). This is for the reason that if the 20 days expire without the'
acknowledgment coming back, and the plaintiff must now get the sum-
mons into the hands of a process service, there will be that much less
time left for service.
582
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court's position that service is not effective on mailing.43
The court acknowledged that its holding, which mandates personal
service within the 120-day limit when the defendant refuses to return
acknowledgment of receipt, may seem harsh.4 4 However, the court
found that "the rules promote such considerable flexibility that their re-
quirements are not likely to be unjustly applied."'4 5 The court cited
three examples of the rules' flexibility.4 6 First, a plaintiff has a choice of
methods to effect service.4 7 Second, Rule 4(j) provides a good cause
exception.48 Third, a plaintiff may seek to enlarge the time period in
which service may be effected pursuant to Rule 6(b). 49 Thus, the Third
Circuit held that personal service must follow a failed attempt of service
by mail.
Finally, the court considered Green's arguments in support of re-
versing the district court's dismissal of the complaint. 50 First, Green ar-
gued that service was, indeed, effected upon first-class mailing.5 1 The
Id. at 113-14. See also Mullenix, The New Federal Express: Mail Service of Process
under Amended Rule 4, 4 REv] LITIGATION 299, 326-28 (1985) (service must be
effected within 120-day period pursuant to Rule 4(j)).
43. Green, 816 F.2d at 882. For a discussion of the cases upon which the
Green court based its decision, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 883.
45. Id.
46. Id. For a discussion of the examples of flexibility, see infra notes 47-49
and accompanying text.
47. Green, 816 F.2d at 883. The plaintiff may choose the appropriate
method of service by balancing costs, speed, convenience and effectiveness of
service. Id. Additionally, the court noted that a defendant cannot flagrantly ig-
nore the procedural requirements of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) without some repercus-
sions. Id. At least one court has held that the costs to effect service by other
methods may include attorney fees. Id. (citing C.I.T. Leasing Corp. v. Manth
Mach. & Tool Corp., No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file)).
48. Green, 816 F.2d at 883. For a discussion of the good cause exception,
see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. See also Moorehead v. Miller, 102
F.R.D. 834, 836 (D.V.I. 1984) (good cause shown for delay of service and com-
plaint not dismissed).
49. Green, 816 F.2d at 883. Rule 6(b) states:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with
or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request there-
for is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b),
59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
50. Green, 816 F.2d at 883-84.
51. Id. at 884. Green argued that CorpusJuris Secundum provided that service
was "complete when all the required acts [were] done." Id. (quoting 72 C.J.S.
1988] 583
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court rejected that argument by responding that service was not effected
upon the mailing of the complaint and summons. 52 Green alternatively
argued that although service was not made, the good cause exception to
the 120-day limit was applicable and, therefore, the complaint was
wrongfully dismissed.5 3 The court was unsympathetic to this argument,
since Green had filed the complaint the day before the statute of limita-
tions expired and attempted service of process by mail on the eve of the
service deadline. 54 The court further stated that Green's argument that
he was not inadvertent or dilatory was equivalent to a misunderstanding
of the law, and an erroneous interpretation of the law simply does not
constitute "good cause."' 55 Thus, the court concluded that Green's ar-
ticulated justification did not fall within the good cause exception.5 6
Therefore, the court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing
Green's complaint. 5
7
The Green decision is in accord with most of the case law existing in
other circuits. 58 However, many circuits have yet to address the precise
Process § 43 (1951)). Thus, Green argued service was complete upon mailing.
Id. The court found this argument unpersuasive. First, the court noted that
Corpus Juris Secundum was not helpful since it was no less ambiguous than the
language of the rule. Id. Secondly, the rule speaks of not only service by mail,
but also provides for personal service when acknowledgment is not returned. Id.
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)). Thus, in considering the entire scheme of
Rule 4 (c)(2)(C) (ii), "all the required acts" include more than mere mailing of the
complaint. Id. Here, plaintiff simply failed to do all the required acts. Id.
52. Id. For a discussion of why the court found service ineffective upon
mailing, see supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
53. Green, 816 F.2d at 884. The court noted that Green attempted to-
demonstrate good cause in the appellate action, but failed to do so at the trial
level. Id. Despite the fact that plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Tinari, was given three
opportunities to present facts to justify the delay in service, he made no attempt
to make such a showing. Id.
54. Id. at 883-84.
55. Id. at 884. The court stated, "[w]e need not decide here the parameters
of the 'good cause' exception to Rule 4(j), for it is clear that an unjustified mis-
understanding of the requirements of the law will not suffice." Id. See also Ruley
v. Nelson, 106 F.R.D. 514, 517-18 (D. Nev. 1985) (dismissal for failure to show
good cause where attorney was unaware of existence of Rule 4(j)).
56. Green, 816 F.2d at 884.
57. Id. at 885. The court found that the district court judge did not abuse
his discretion in directing Green to show good cause or for dismissing the com-
plaint. Id.
58. See, e.g., Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 447-48 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (acknowledgment form must be returned to effect service by mail); Del
Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 1987) (service by mail is not com-
plete until acknowledged); Delta S.S. Lines v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th
Cir. 1985) (defendant's return and acknowledgment are essential to service);
Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir. 1984)
(effectiveness of service by mail dependent upon response by defendant).
The Green decision is also internally consistent. See, e.g., Stranahan Gear Co.
v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1986) (where service by mail is ineffective,
personal service must follow); Systems Indus. v. Han, No. 84-5457 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 15, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (following Stranahan); Reid v.
9
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issue that was raised in Green.5 9 Because the language of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is unclear, reasonable persons may differ on when service
is effected where mail service is attempted, but return acknowledgment
is not received. 60
For example, in Morse v. Elmira Country Club,6 t the Second Circuit
held, contrary to the Green decision, that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) does not
"void a received-but-unacknowledged mail service."' 62 The court based
its holding on the well-established principle that Rule 4 should be liber-
ally construed in the interest of justice and equity. 63 Since, the defend-
ant in Morse received mail service but refused to acknowledge it
properly,64 the court found no rationale to permit a properly served de-
fendant to deliberately thwart service by mail. 6 5 The Second Circuit
stated that its conclusion-that service by mail was effectuated on re-
ceipt-was consistent with the legislative history of Rule 4 and with the
California statute upon which Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was based. 6 6 However,
Accutome, Inc., No. 85-3592 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (service is not complete without return acknowledgment).59. See Green, 816 F.2d at 881. The Third Circuit stated, "no reported deci-
sion has addressed a factual situation exactly like the one presented [in Green]."
Id.
60. Compare id., at 880-81 (service effected only upon return acknowledg-
ment) with Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1984) (ser-
vice effective upon receipt of complaint and summons). For a further discussion
of why reasonable persons may differ on this issue, see infra note 91 and accom-
panying text.
61. Morse, 752 F.2d 35. In Morse, defendant refused to return the acknowl-
edgment form after plaintiff mailed service. Id. at 36. Personal service was sub-
sequently served upon defendant, but only after the applicable statute of
limitations had run. Id. at 37.
62. Id. at 39. The issue in Morse, unlike that in Green, was whether the plain-
tiff tolled the statute of limitations. Id. See Green, 816 F.2d at 879 (deciding when
mail service is effected for purposes of Rule 4(j) if acknowledgment is not
received).
63. See Morse, 752 F.2d at 40. See also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1083 at 10 (1987) (citing cases which state Rules of
Federal Procedure should be liberally construed in interest of justice and
fairness).
64. Morse, 752 F.2d at 40. The defendant gave no adequate explanation
why acknowledgment was withheld. Id. Notably, in Green there was similarly no
dispute that defendant actually received copies of the complaint and summons.
Green, 816 F.2d at 878.
65. Morse, 752 F.2d at 40. The court stated: "We have been given no ade-
quate explanation why the acknowledgment was withheld here, nor any proper
basis for nullifying mail service deliberately left unacknowledged." Id.
66. Morse, 752 F.2d at 40 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30(c) (West
1973)). The California statute states: "[s]ervice of summons pursuant to this
section is complete on the date a written acknowledgment of receipt of sum-
mons is executed, if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to sender." Id.
(quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30(c) (West 1973)) (emphasis added by
court).
The Morse court stated that Congress conspicuously excluded the above
provision from Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), and that the history of the rule indicates that
10
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the Green court also relied upon the legislative history of Rule 4 and
reached the opposite conclusion-that service by mail is not effective
upon receipt. 6 7 Thus, while both the Morse and Green courts recognized
that the original version of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) made service effective
upon receipt, the courts differed in their interpretations of the congres-
sional intent underlying the existing rule.68
Although the approaches taken by both the Green and Morse courts
are reasonable in absence of more definite guidance, it is submitted that
the Green court's interpretation of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is the better view. 69
The Third Circuit's determination that service is not effected until de-
fendant's return of acknowledgment eliminates the need of evidentiary
hearings to determine when and if service was received by the defend-
ant. 70 While requiring that acknowledgment be returned in order to
effectuate service allows a defendant to deliberately thwart service by
mail, 7 ' it is submitted that such abuse by the defendant is not without a
the deletion was intentional. Id. at 41. The court found that Congress rejected
the certified or registered mail system to ensure actual notice of claims against
defendants. Id.
67. Green, 816 F.2d at 879-81. For a discussion of the Green court's reason-
ing, see supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
68. See Morse, 752 F.2d at 41; contra Green, 816 F.2d at 880. The Morse court
concluded that Congress gave no indication that it intended to change the effec-
tiveness of service upon final receipt. Morse, 752 F.2d at 41. See also Deshmukh
v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (service complete upon mail-
ing). However, the Green court concluded that Congress' rejection of the pro-
posed language suggested that service is not effective upon receipt. Green, 816
F.2d at 880 (citing 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (state-
ment of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434,
4439 n.8, 96 F.R.D. 75, 118 n.8 (1983)).
The Green court also relied upon Rule 5 and the good cause exception of
4(j) to reach its decision. Green, 816 F.2d at 880-81. For further discussion of
the Green court's analysis, see supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
69. See Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 1, at 32 ("Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is quite
clear. The Rule states that if the defendant fails to return the acknowledgment
form, the plaintiff is required to make personal service."); Siegel, supra note 1, at
113-14 (personal service not effected if acknowledgment form is not returned);
see also Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 661 F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(Morse court "was at pains .... to tease [its] interpretation out of the [Rule].").
The majority of circuits that have considered the issue have held, consistent with
Green, that acknowledgment must be returned to effect service. For a discussion
of these cases, see infra note 74.
70. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. See also Morse, 752 F.2d at 41 n.12 (recognizing
need for evidentiary hearings). The Green court found that such evidentiary
hearings would burden the parties and the courts. Green, 816 F.2d at 881.
71. See Green, 816 F.2d at 882; see, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg.
Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984) (defendants may ignore service by
mail with only repercussion being cost to effectuate personal service); Bernard v.
Strang Air, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 336, 338 (D. Neb. 1985) ("receipt of the acknowl-
edgment . . . is a necessity for effective service by mail"); Billy v. Ashland Oil
Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 234 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (federal rules failed to contemplate
defendants' deliberate refusal to acknowledge return service by mail; neverthe-
less, return acknowledgment is required to complete service).
586 [Vol. 33: p. 576
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remedy. 72 Rule 4(c)(2)(D) provides that, unless good cause is shown,
the court shall order payment of the costs of personal service to the
plaintiff where the defendant fails to return acknowledgment. 7 3
Four circuits and numerous district courts have reached conclusions
consistent with Green in finding a return acknowledgment crucial to ef-
fect mailed service.7 4 For instance, in Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking,75 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia severely criti-
cized the reasoning of Morse. 76 The Combs court stated that a liberal con-
struction of Rule 4, in order to achieve equity and justice, cannot be a
substitute for the requirements of the provision. 77 The court further
72. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(D). The Green court noted that "defendants
may not openly and with impunity flout the procedural requirements of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)." 816 F.2d at 883. Such a defendant may be required to pay costs
under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and attorneys fees in both arranging personal service
and making the motion to recover such costs. Id. See also C.I.T. Leasing Corp. v.
Manth Mach. & Tool Corp., No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (plaintiff recovered costs for personal service in addi-
tion to attorney's fees); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Eden's Own Prods. Inc., 101 F.R.D.
96, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (plaintiff is entitled to costs of personal service where
defendant failed to respond to mailed service). But see Excalibur Oil, Inc. v.
Gable, 105 F.R.D. 543, 545 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (only costs for subsequent per-
sonal service are recoverable when defendant fails to return acknowledgment).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(D). Rule 4(c)(2)(D) states:
Unless good cause is shown for not doing so the court shall order the
payment of the costs of personal service by the person served if such
person does not complete and return within 20 days after mailing, the
notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons.
Id.
At least one court has awarded attorney's fees in addition to the costs of
personal service. C.I.T. Leasing Corp. v. Manth Mach., No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). See also Billy v. Ashland Oil
Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 231-35 (plaintiff recovered costs of personal service
although complaint was dismissed on grounds that personal service was not ef-
fectuated within 120-day deadline after failed attempted mail service).
74. See, e.g., Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 447-48 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (acknowledgment form must be returned to effect service by mail); Del
Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 1987) (service by mail is not com-
plete until acknowledged); Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d
Cir. 1986) (where service by mail is ineffective, personal service must follow);
Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant
return and acknowledgment are essential to service); Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-
Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir. 1984) (effectiveness of service
by mail is dependent upon response by defendant); Systems Indus. v. Han, No.
84-5457 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (following
Stranahan); Reid v. Accutome, Inc., No. 85-3592 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (service is not complete without return
acknowledgment).
75. 825 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 446. In Combs, when plaintiff attempted service by mail, defend-
ants failed to return acknowledgment. Id. at 439. There was no subsequent at-
tempt to effect service. Id. at 444.
77. Id. at 446. The court stated, "Congress realized that defendants might
not cooperate in this fashion, but nevertheless chose to limit the penalty im-
posed in such cases to imposition of the cost of personal service." Id. at 447
1988]
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found that legislative history of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) makes clear that ser-
vice is "complete" only if the acknowledgment is returned. 78
Thus, courts do not dispute that the legislative history of Rule 4
indicates that Congress intended actual notice to be given to defend-
ants. 79 However, the courts are split as to whether the language of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), which states that personal service shall be made, is
mandatory or directory in situations in which the defendant has received
actual notice but fails to return the acknowledgment form.8 0 Neither the
legislative history nor the rule itself clearly resolve the issue as to
whether ineffective mail service must be followed by personal service or
whether service by an alternative method is sufficient. 8 ' The Third Cir-
cuit in Green provided a reasonable interpretation of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
in holding that a plaintiff must personally serve a defendant within 120
days of filing the complaint.8 2 However, other courts have interpreted
the rule differently.8 3
In Humana, Inc. v. Jacobson,8 4 the Fifth Circuit held that if an attempt
(citing 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4447, 96
F.R.D. 75, 114 (1983)).
78. Id. at 447 (citing 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982)
(statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4434, 4447, 96 F.R.D. 75, 114 (1983)). The Combs court found legislative history
to indicate that return of acknowledgment is essential to establish in personam
jurisdiction. Combs, 825 F.2d at 446.
The Green court further cited the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), Rule
4(c)(2)(D), and Form 18-A to support the position that return acknowledgment
must be received to effectuate service. 816 F.2d at 883. But see Morse, 752 F.2d
at 41 (legislative history indicates that mail service is effected upon receipt by
defendant); Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(same).
79. Green, 816 F.2d at 880; see Morse, 752 F.2d at 879-81.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). For the text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see
supra note 1. For a discussion of the conflict between the courts, see supra notes
58-68 and accompanying text.
81. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See also Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc. 102
F.R.D. 230, 234 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (amendments to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) are
needed).
82. Green, 816 F.2d at 881 (ineffective mail service must be followed by per-
sonal service). See, e.g., Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 57 (3d
Cir. 1986) (no acknowledgment within 20 days of mailing requires personal ser-
vice); Delta S.S. Lines v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) mandates personal service after failed attempt at mailed service);
Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984)
(personal service authorized by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
83. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v.Jacobson, 804 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff has option of methods of service following attempted mail service);
Academy Life Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 84-4989 (E.D. Pa. April 17, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which allows ser-
vice pursuant to state statute, are alternative means of service after service by
mail is ineffective).
84. 804 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1986).
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at mail service fails, subsequent service is not limited to personal ser-
vice.8 5 The court found that a literal interpretation, of the language
that personal service "shall" be made, distorts the purpose of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii).86
It is submitted that the Green court's interpretation of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is more logical than that of the Humana court. 8 7 A literal
reading of the rule mandates personal service after a failed attempt at
service by mail.8 8 Although the Humana court's interpretation promotes
equity to the plaintiff by providing a choice of methods of service, it
ignores the policy of providing the defendant with actual notice. Fur-
thermore, it is submitted that the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) should
not be overridden in the absence of specific legislative intent to support
85. Id. 804 F.2d at 1393. In Humana, the plaintiff attempted service by mail
upon the defendant; however, only one copy of the required notice and acknowl-
edgment form was enclosed, instead of two copies. Id. at 1392-93. Additionally,
no return envelope was enclosed and the defendant never acknowledged re-
ceipt. Id. at 1393. The plaintiff subsequently attempted personal service, which
also failed as the defendant had moved from Texas to California. Id. at 1393.
The plaintiff then served process on the Texas Secretary of State, a method of
service permitted by Texas law. Id.
86. Id. The court stated that, "congressional action, designed to ensure fair
treatment of defendants, indicates no intention to create unfairness for plaintiffs
by eliminating an otherwise permissible method of service." Id. (citing Morse,
752 F.2d at 40-41 n.9). Thus, the Humana court found that the language, "shall
be made [by personal service]," does not automatically require personal service
after an ineffective attempt at service by mail. Id. The court concluded that Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) permits service pursuant to state methods of service of process
when an attempt to effect service by mail fails. Id. For the text of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra note 1.
87. Green, 816 F.2d at 881 (ineffective mail service must be followed by per-
sonal service). See also Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir.
1986) (no acknowledgment within 20 days of mailing requires personal service);
Delta S.S. Lines v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
mandates personal service after failed attempt at mailed service); Armco, Inc. v.
Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984) (personal ser-
vice authorized by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii));Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 64 ("it
has become apparent that once service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is attempted,
the subsequent shifting of service devices is not permited").
88. See, e.g., Green, 816 F.2d at 881 (personal service must follow failed at-
tempt at service by mail to effectuate service); Coldwell Banker & Co. v Eyde,
661 F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("plain language ... calls for personal
service in the absence of the acknowledgment's timely return"); Billy v. Ashland
Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 233 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
mandates personal service). For the text of rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra note 1.
Interestingly, both the Green and Humana courts indicated that the language
of the rule supports their views. The Humana court stated that Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)'s "language is clear: the plaintiff has the option to elect" a method
of service. 804 F.2d at 1393. The court, however, admitted that a literal inter-
pretation of the rule would require personal service. Id. The Green court found
that the Rule mandated personal service after a failed attempt of service by mail.
Green, 816 F.2d at 881. This example illustrates the notion that the legislative
history may be of limited value, as it can be used as support for opposing
interpretations.
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss3/5
590 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33: p. 576
such an approach.8 9 Although the courts are not in agreement as to
what constitutes proper service after a failed attempt at mail service or at
what time mail service is effected, they do agree that, following an inef-
fective attempt at service by mail, proper service must be made within
120 days after filing the complaint, pursuant to Rule 4(j).90 This may be
the only aspect of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) which is not subject to controversy.
It is submitted that while there is no "right" or "wrong" way to
interpret Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the rule lends itself to varying interpreta-
tions as a result of poor draftsmanship. 9 1 The Third Circuit in Green
eliminated some of the guesswork that previously confronted practition-
ers, by supplying reasonable interpretations of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and
40).92 However, in most circuits many questions arising from Rule
4(c) (2)(C)(ii) remain unanswered; thus, the use of service by mail contin-
ues to have uncertain consequences. 9 3
In four years, more than seventy court decisions have unsuccessfully
attempted to explain service by mail. 94 Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was enacted
to lessen the delay and expense of the service of process. 9 5 However, it
89. See Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1986)
("We do not believe that 'factors of justice and equity' can override the unam-
biguous terms of a specific service rule.").
90. SeeJarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 66 ("it appears that the twenty-day
period, whenever it commences and concludes, is part of the 120 days from the
time the complaint is filed in which the plaintiff must effect service"). Even the
Second Circuit, which has held mail service effective upon receipt has concluded
that improper mail service must be followed by proper service within the 120-
day limitation. Morse, 752 F.2d at 42. See also Green, 816 F.2d at 882-83;
Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, Inc., 766 F.2d 737, 738-40 (2d Cir. 1985)
(complaint dismissed where mailed service not received before 120-day dead-
line); Boykin v. Commerce Union Bank, 109 F.R.D. 344, 349 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
(defendant must receive mailed service within 120 days of filing complaint);
Shuster v. Conley, 107 F.R.D. 755, 757-58 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (complaint dismissed
where mailed service not received before 120-day deadline).
91. See Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 3 (courts are not to blame for
making Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) unpredictable; they are working with poorly drafted
rule).
92. See Green, 816 F.2d at 879-83. The Green court addressed three issues
and concluded: 1) service by mail is effected only upon return of acknowledg-
ment form; 2) personal service must follow a failed attempt of service by mail,
and 3) personal service must be made within 120 days of the filing of the com-
plaint. Id. at 881-83. For further discussion of the reasonableness of the Third
Circuit's approach, see supra notes 69-73 & 87-89 and accompanying text.
93. See Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 3 (courts have gutted Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and "made it difficult to predict the outcome of future case, and
confused the practicing bar"). For a discussion of additional Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
issues that continue to be litigated, see infra note 96.
94. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983); see also Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 1-75
(citing cases which have interpreted Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
95. See 128 CONG. REC. H9848-56 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4434, 4444,
96 F.R.D. 75, 117 (1983); see also Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 74 ("the Rule
is plagued by unanswered questions and inconsistences").
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is submitted that the excessive litigation surrounding the rule has done
nothing but increase the very evils it was designed to eliminate. 96 Thus,
it is submitted that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) should be amended or replaced.
It is suggested that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) be redrafted to specifically
address and clarify the areas in which the courts are in disagreement. 9 7
Alternatively, some commentators have suggested that mail service
should be completely eliminated, and that personal service be made
upon every defendant. 98 A third option is to keep Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
intact, but require that mail service be effectuated via registered or certi-
fied mail with return receipt requested. 99 It is recognized that amend-
96. Numerous issues surrounding Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) continue to be liti-
gated. See, e.g., Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774
F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1985) (mailed summons and complaint for petition of arbitra-
tion is not governed by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)); Watts v. Lyon, No. 84-2593 (E.D. Pa.
May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (person signing mailed sum-
mons and complaint for defendant must be defendant's agent); Academy Life
Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 84-4989 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (invalid mail service may be followed by personal service, but not
mandatory); Fee v. Steve Snyder Enter., No. 84-2323 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (plaintiff can recover costs of personal service
and attorney's fees when defendant refuses to return acknowledgment of service
by mail); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Gable, 105 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. I11. 1985) (only costs
recoverable to plaintiff after defendant refuses to return acknowledgment of
mailed service are costs to effect personal service); Madden v. Cleland, 105
F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (enclosing wrong process form does not invalidate
service by mail); Bernard v. Strang Air, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 336 (N.D. Neb. 1985)
(mailed service quashed when plaintiff failed to include notice and acknowledg-
ment forms and pre-paid, self-addressed envelope); Zisman v. Sieger, 106
F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (discussing use of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) in foreign
country in light of Hague Convention); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (construing Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) for international service), rev'd in
part 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986); Shuster v. Conley, 107 F.R.D. 755 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (request for extension of time to effect service denied where mailed ser-
vice returned marked "insufficient address"); Cool v. Police Dep't of Yonkers,
No. 76-1303 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (com-
plaint dismissed when service by mail attempted 41/2 years after complaint was
filed); Boggs v. Darr, 103 F.R.D. 526 (D. Kan. 1984) (permitting service by mail
nationally); William B. May Co. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (deny-
ing use of service by mail when defendant resides outside of state of district
court); Prather v. Raymond Constr. Co., 570 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (ex-
amining retroactive effect of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
97. See Billy v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 234 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) should be amended to curb abuses caused by defendants deliber-
ately refusing to acknowledge mailed service). For a discussion of other issues
left unanswered by the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra note 96.
98. Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 2, at 74-75 (because of the numerous
problems encountered with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), "[a]ttempts to keep the present
system and modify it will only result in more confusion, more abuse, more litiga-
tion, more costs, and ultimately, less justice"). For a discussion of other
problems with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra note 96.
99. See Note, Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You More Than a Stamp, 61 IND.
L.J. 217, 241-45 (1986). Notably, the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee
originally recommended service by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM. ON RULES
1988]
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss3/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ing or replacing Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is no easy task.' 0 0 It is also
inevitable that there would be unanswered questions arising from any
such amended or new rule. However, it is submitted that the problems
arising from an amended or new rule are likely to be fewer than those
which Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) has created. 10 ' In absence of amendment, it is
suggested that much of the confusion surrounding Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
would be eliminated if other circuits adopted the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j).
The Third Circuit provided a stringent interpretation of Rules
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j). 10 2 It held that mail service is effective only upon
plaintiff's receipt of acknowledgment, 10 3 and that a failed attempt at
mail service must be followed by personal service. 10 4 Moreover, such
personal service must be made within 120 days of the filing of the com-
plaint.10 5 While the above requirements potentially operate to the det-
riment of plaintiffs, 10 6 they are reasonable in light of the express
language of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j), as well as the legislative history
and case law. 10 7 Thus, it is submitted that if the Green holding, which is
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAF-T OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
RULES 4 AND 45 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Sept. 1981), re-
printed in 91 F.R.D. 139, 146-47 (1982). For a discussion of the criticism that
followed the proposal, see supra note 1.
100. See Spaniol, Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 A.B.A. J. 1645
(1983) (discussing the process of enacting federal rules); Weinstein, Reform of
Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 938-64 (1976) (dis-
cussing the procedural process of rule making).
101. For a discussion of some problems created by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see
supra note 96.
102. For a discussion of the Green court's conservative interpretation of
Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j), see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
103. Green, 816 F.2d at 879. More liberal courts have held that service is
effective upon defendant's receipt of mailed service. See Morse, 752 F.2d at 39.
For further discussion of federal courts' interpretations of when service by mail
is effective, see supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
104. Green, 816 F.2d at 881. Courts have interpreted Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) less
stringently and have permitted a plaintiff to elect the method of service to follow
a failed attempt at service by mail. See Humana, 804 F.2d at 1393. For further
discussion of the method of service to follow a failed attempt at service by mail,
see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
105. Green, 816 F.2d at 882-83. For further discussion of the interplay be-
tween Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and the 120-day deadline of Rule 4(j), see supra note
90 and accompanying text.
106. Compare Green, 816 F.2d at 879, 882-83 (service by mail not effective
until return acknowledgment received by plaintiff; failed service by mail must be
followed with personal service) with Humana, 804 F.2d at 1393 (plaintiff may
choose method of service to follow failed mail service) and Morse, 752 F.2d at 39
(mail service effective upon defendant's receipt).
107. For a discussion of the reasonableness of the Green court's interpreta-
tion of Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j), see supra notes 69-73 & 87-89 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 33: p. 576
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both reasonable and consistent, is adopted by other circuits some of the
cloud of confusion hovering over Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) will be lifted.
Leigh Christy Schaller
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